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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GINA A. POLEDNA, 
Claimant/Appellant, 
Supreme Court No. 42220 
V. 
THORNE RESEARCH, INC. 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho 
Gina A. Poledna 
c/o Mark B. Jones #4589 
IV. 1rney a: Law 
P.O. Box 579 
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P.O. Box 25 
Dover, ID 83825-0025 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gina A. Poledna (Poledna), Claimant/Appellant, applied for 
unemployment insurance benefits, which were denied by the Idaho Department of 
Labor (IDOL). The IDOL Appeals Examiner denied a subsequent Appeal, finding that 
"Claimant voluntarily quit a job without good cause connected with employment" and 
that the "Employer's account is not chargeable for experience rating purposes!' 
The claim was appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, which denied the 
appeal on May 19, 2014, making the Decision and Order a final Order under Idaho 
Code 72-1368(7). 
The Appellant now seeks relief from the Court. 
BACKGROUND/FACTS 
Poledna was a iong time employee of Thorne Research, Inc., (Thorne), starting 
employment with Thorne as a production worker in May 2002. 1 
Begining in 2007, Poledna began experiencing wrist pain, which she felt was 
caused by work related activity at Thome. Poledna sought medical treatment from Dr. 
Di Benedetto at that time. Eventually, the wrist problem resolved to the point she 
returned to work with a wrist brace. 2 
By November of 2013, Poledna was experiencing severe bilateral pain in her 
wrists, and she again sought medical treatment. She received a diagnosis of bilateral 
carpal tunnel syndrome. Her orthopedist, Dr. Di Benedetto, stated in his treatment 
1 Agency Record, page 2 
2 Agency Record, page 2 
notes that work made her pain worse, and caused her harm. 
After learning of the diagnosis, and realizing that cont!nuing work in her present 
capacity wouid aggravate her wrist condition, Poledna sought accommodation from 
Thorne which would allow her to work with the manipulative restrictions presented by 
her medical condition. The request for accommodation was denied, and Thorne told 
Poledna they did not have any other work available. Poledna left employment with 
Thorne after they refused accommodation, and thereafter she filed for unemployment 
benefits, which were denied.3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court has limited jurisdiction in this matter as set out in Idaho Code 72-732 
and 72-733, et al. Pursuant to Idaho Code 72-732, the Court may only affirm or set 
aside the Decision and Order upon the following grounds: 
(1) The Commission's findings of fact are not based on substantial 
competent evidence; 
(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; 
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; 
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(1.) The Commission's Decision and Order issued in this matter is not based on 
substantial competent evidence, as the Order is void of a description of the job 
performed by Poledna, does not set forth or consider the physical requirements 
3Transcript pages 6-8, 11-13 
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necessary to perform Poledna's job, does not identify, discuss, or consider the 
manipulative requirements necessary to perform Po!edna's job, does not 
consider how Poledna's work hours would effect her ability to perform the 
unidentified job, nor does it consider or discuss all of these facts in combination 
to determine if Poledna had "good cause" for leaving employment. 
(2.) The Commission's Decision and Order failed to recognize that Poledna had 
Statutory "good cause" under IDAPA Rule 09.01 .30.450, for leaving her 
employment. 
(3.) The findings of fact are not supported as a matter of law as the Decision and 
Order found that the "Claimant voluntarily quit a job without good cause 
connected with employment." 
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THE COMMISSION'S DECISION AND ORDER ISSUED IN THIS MATTER IS NOT 
BASED ON SUBSTANTiAL COMPETENT EViDENCE. 
The IDOL Appeals Examiner denied the Appeal finding that "Claimant voluntarily 
quit a job without good cause connected with employment" and that the "Employer's 
account is not chargeable for experience rating purposes."4 
The Examiner/Commission determined that Poledna "voluntarily quit a job 
without good cause connected to employment"5 without ever knowing what job Poledna 
performed, the physical requirements necessary to perform this job, and what is most 
important, the manipulative requirements necessary to perform the job. 
With all due respect to both the Examiner and the Commission, the Decision and 
Order are fundamentally defective, as they fail to identify, discuss or consider: 
(1.) The job performed by Poledna, 
(2.) The physical requirement necessary to perform Poledna's job, 
(3.), The manipulative requirements necessary to perform Poiedna's job. 
Lacking this basic knowledge, how could the Examiner/Commission determine 
Poledna quit without "good cause?" 
The Commission had Poledna's medical records. How could any reasonable 
person then determine someone could perform a job without some basic job description 
and some basic understanding of the physical requirements needed to preform the job? 
The Commission determined that the "Claimant worked in the bottling and 
labeling departments over the span of her career. Her duties included setting up 
'4 Agency Record page 1 
5 Agency Record page 26 
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machines, cleaning, putting labels on products and boxing them. She worked between 
36 and 44 hours per week."6 This statement is the only description of the job Po!edna 
performed at Thorne. 
There is clear unmistakable error on the face of the Decision and Order, as the 
Decision is completely silent and void of any discussion of what job Poledna performed 
at Thorne. It is impossible to determine that Poledna could do her job, without knowing 
what her job was, or to determine that she had quit without "good cause." 
It is impossible to determine someone can perform a job without knowing the 
physical requirements necessary to perform it. A job description with some information 
about physical demands is the starting point for any analysis of whether someone has 
the physical capacities to perform a job. Without some basic understanding of what the 
job is to be performed, the Commission is making a determination with no basis in fact. 
It is guessing Poledna could do the job. 
How much weight did Poledna lift? Was there overhead reaching? Was Poledna 
twisting or bending her wrists? If so, how often, what percentage of the day? Did her job 
require fine finger dexterity? Was Poledna performing production work, and if so was 
there an expected rate of production? 
Because the Commission knew Poledna has documented manipuiative 
restrictions, understanding and discussing the manipulative requirements of the job 
Poledna performed is critical to the analysis of whether she could perform the job. 
Again, no information was obtained and no discussion was made in the Decision and 
6 Agency Record page 21 
Appellant's Brief 8 
Order as to what manipulative requirements were necessary to perform the job. This 
means that the Commission had no basis in fact when it determined that Po!edna "quit" 
without good cause. This means that the Examiner and the Commission had to guess 
or assume what Poledna was doing at Thorne. 
Obtaining a job description was critical to the analysis of whether Poledna could 
perform her job when contrasted against what her doctor said, and what Poledna 
testified to. A basic job description is the standard by which all other evidence was to be 
compared and judged, especially the medical evidence and testimony of Poledna. The 
failure to obtain and discuss Poledna's job description meant no other reasonable 
analysis could be made of the other evidence of record. It is a fatal flaw in the Decision 
and Order, which leaves everything else up to speculation. 
Finally, the testimony of record, which is not disputed, is that Poledna was 
working at Thorne three (3) 12 hour days, then an 8-hour day, with some overtime. 7 
Poledna's work schedule was also a factor which needed to be considered and 
contrasted against the physical requirements of her job as she was working 12 hour 
days. This schedule required Poledna to perform an additional four hours of work (when 
compared to a normal work day) and limited her "down time" (time off from work) 
between work days. In other words, she had significantly less time between the end of 
her shift and the start of the next shift during the three 12 hour day periods. This would 
allow for substantially less physical recovery time between shifts. While the schedule is 
of record, it is not considered or discussed in the Decision and Order. It is, in and of 
7 Agency Record page 21, Transcript page 12-13 
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itself, a significant factor in considering whether Poledna had "good cause" for quitting. 
THE DECISION AND ORDER FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT POLEDNA HAD 
STATUTORY "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER IDAPA RULE 09.01.30.450 FOR QUITTING 
HER EMPLOYMENT. 
It is undisputed that Poledna has manipulative restrictions, as evidenced by the 
medical records contained in the record, and as discussed by the Commission. The 
Commission did not dispute the severity of the limitations, nor did they dispute any of 
Poledna's allegations concerning her manipulative limitations. It is also undisputed that 
Poledna approached Thorne about accommodating her manipulative limitations, which 
they refused to do. There is no evidence to the contrary. 
Poledna testified that she sought accommodation from Thorne, but they told her 
that there was "no light duty positions availab!e."8 
Even the Examiner seems to accept Poledna's testimony, stating "Okay. So, 
there isn't another job for - - that they had for you to do at Thorne Research, but my 
question still is why not go find another job with another employer wbile you still 
continue to work?"9 But the answer is clear, she had no work to return to at Thorne. 
Thorne knew Poledna had manipulative limitations which prevented her from continuing 
performance of her existing job. When Thorne refused to accommodate her medical 
condition, and refused to place her into other work, they effected a constructive firing, 
Thome knew Poledna was unable to continue, and when they refused to 
accommodate, they knew she could not continue at her present job. Thorne created an 
6 Transcript page 12-13 
9 Transcript page 12 
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impossible employment situation for Poiedna, and had to know this when it refused 
accommodation. Thome got rid of Polenda by refusing accommodation. 
The Commission in the Decision and Order cites Edwards v. Independence 
Serv., Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 P.3d 954, 957 (2004) stating "If a ciaimant 
voluntarily quits, the claimant bears the burden of proving, by preponderance of the 
evidence, thats/he quit for "good cause." The Commission then cites Edwards stating 
"A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to 
it, has more convincing force and from which a greater probability of truth results." k!. At 
916, 104 P3d at 958. 
In this matter, there is no opposing evidence to suggest that anything other than 
what Po!edna testified to had occurred. Poledna presented with a medical condition and 
sought accommodation or a change in duties which Thorne refused. By virtue of 
Thorne's refusal to accommodate or change her position, they knew Poledna had no 
choice but to leave employment. 
And what if Poledna had stayed, as suggested by the Examiner? Staying was 
not only physically impossible, but presented Poledna with the very real possibility that 
she wouid be terminated for cause (poor work performance) if she remained at Thorne. 
Being terminated "for cause" could restrict or limit unemployment benefits. 10 If Polectna 
stayed at Thorne, as suggested by the examiner, she faced the very real possibility of 
being disqualified for unemployment benefits, if she were to be fired for cause. 
Poledna needs only show this Court that she had "good cause" for quitting 
10 Generally, if an employee is tenninated for misconduct, they can be denied 
unemployment benefits. 
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employment with Thorne. 
The Idaho Administrative Code, u:1der section 09.01 .30.450 defines "good 
cause" when an employee quits work. This section states in part: 
01. Burden of Proof 
The claimant has the burden of proof to establish that he voluntarily left his 
employment with good cause in connection with the employment to be eligible 
for benefits. (3-19-99) 
02. Cause Connected with Employment 
To be connected with employment, a claimant's reason(s) for leaving the 
employment must arise from the working conditions, job tasks, or employment 
agreement. If the claimant's reason(s) for leaving the employment arise from 
personal/non job-related matters, the reasons are not connected with the 
claimant's employment (3-19-99) 
03. Good Cause 
The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of reasonableness 
as applied to the average man or woman. Whether good cause is present 
depends upon whether a reasonable person would consider the circumstances 
resulting in the claimant's unemployment to be real, substantial, and compelling. 
05. Quit Due to Health or Physical Condition 
A claimant whose unemployment is due to his health or physical condition which 
makes it impossible for him to continue to perform the duties of the job shall be 
deemed to have quit work with good cause connected with employment. 
In this case, Poledna had a documented medical condition, which the employer 
refused to accommodate. Thorne also refused to move her or change her job duties. 
Poledna could not continue performing the job at Thorne due to her manipulative 
restrictions. She either had to continue performing this job, or quit. She had no other 
choice. Thorne was well aware that she had prior wrist issues and a prior worker 
compensation claim. The Commission was aware of this too. Poledna did the right thing 
seeking accommodation or a position change. When Thorne refused, she had no 
choice but to quit. Poledna had "good cause" as set out in IDAPA 09.01 .30.450.05. 
Po!ed~3 did not h211e 2 vi2b!e option a,,:_::;ilablp, h8ving been refused 
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accommodation by Thorne. 11 Poledna explored her options with Thorne and had none. 
Poiedna therefore had "good cause'' for !eaving employment. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED AS A MATTER OF LAW AS THE 
DECISION AND ORDER FOUND THAT THE "CLAIMANT VOLUNTARILY QUIT A 
JOB WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE CONNECTED WITH EMPLOYMENT." 
The Commission determined in the Decision and Order that "The only medical 
evidence in the record was provided by the claimant's own doctor, who did not 
recommend that the claimant take time off from work; did not recommend that the 
claimant change occupations; and did not recommend that the claimant discontinue 
working." 12 
The Commission does not dispute that Poiedna has bilateral carpal tunnel 
syndrome. 
The Commission had in its possession the notes of Dr. Di Benedetto, an 
orthopedic surgeon, dated December 13, 2013, which states "\Ne discussed options 
including carpal tunnel release, continuing with her symptomatology and iiving with the 
pain, or trying a change in activities. I explained to her I do think that because she feels 
her pain is made \Norse v,1hile at work, then she clearly is having pain related to work. I 
explained l am dubious that her insurance carrier at work is likely to find this to be 
completely associated with work as the only cause. Her question was pretty straight 
forward, which was: Does work cause her pain to get worse and does it cause her 
11 Higgins v. Larrv Miller Subaru Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 4-5, 175 P.3d 163, 166-167 
(2007), requires the employee explore other options than quitting. 
12 Agency Record page 10 
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harm? I believe the answer is yes. She will consider her options. She will contact me if 
she has any further questions." (Emphasis added). 
The evidence of record is that orthopedist Dr. Di Benedetto opined that Poledna 
has bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. that it causes Poledna pain, that it is made worse 
by work activities, and that it causes her harm. Further, Dr. Di Benedetto is clearly 
leaving the decision of what to do up to Poledna as stated in his notes of December 13, 
2013. 
Poledna presented evidence of a documented medical condition, which her 
orthopedist felt was made worse by work and which ''caused her harm." She sought 
accommodation with her employer which was refused. She sought a job change which 
was refused by Thorne. Poledna's orthopedist clearly left the decision up to Poledna. 
Faced with continuing in a job that made her hurt and "caused her harm," Poledna took 
the only option left for her, which was to leave employment. 
The~ Decision and Order are not supported by law as Poledna demonstrated that 
she could no longer continue at Thorne in her present job. A claimant whose 
unemployment is due to his health or physical condition which makes it impossible for 
him to continue to perform the duties of the job shall be deemed to have quit work with 
good cause connected with employment. 
If the Commission argues that she could work, how can they make this 
argument, with no job description or analysis of what physical requirements, especially 
manipulative, were expected of Poledna? How can the Commission say Poledna could 
de her :cb v.'hen thev dc~'t even kno't! or 2n2!,J1ze \A/hat that her ,;ob \A/8S? Anrl nhviouslv 
,I ., ., , 
there could be no rational analysis of the facts absent some understanding of what 
Appellant's Brief 14 
Po!edna did at Thorne. The Decision and Order are therefore not supported in the !aw 
as Po!edna had "good cause" for leaving employment. The Commission cannot argue 
otherv11ise as they have no basis in fact for their finds as they don't even know what 
Poledna did at Thorne. Therefore, the entire Decision and Order is not based in law. 
SUMMATION OF ANALYSIS 
The Commission found that Poledna did not have "good cause" for leaving her 
employment. Yet the Commission did not have Poledna's job description, nor any 
information about the physical or manipulative requirements necessary to perform her 
job. Some understanding of what was physically required of Poledna was absolutely 
necessary to determine if she had "good cause" for leaving employment. Some 
information about the physical and manipulative requirements were absolutely 
necessary as the description of the requirements are what all other information (medical 
documentation and testimony) are judged against. What substantial competent 
evidence did the Commission possess when it didn't know what-Poledna was actually 
doing at Thorne? What foundation does the Commission have in any of its arguments 
without some understanding of the job? How can the findings be based on critical 
analysis when there is no foundational description of the work with which to reason 
with? 
Absent some understanding of what Poledna was doing at Thorne, the 
Commission is guessing, and therefore the Decision and Order cannot be based on 
substantial competent evidence as required by !aw. 
Ruie 09.01 .30.450. 
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The record supports that Poledna had a documented medical condition. The 
records also supports that she sought accommodation from Thorne, or a job change, 
both of which were refused by Thorne. Poledna was experiencing pain and the work 
was causing her harm, based on the opinion of her orthopedist, in her current position. 
Poledna sought and explored her options, which were to continue working in pain, 
which caused her harm, or to quit. No other option existed. Poledna therefore had 
"good cause under the IDAPA for leaving employment. 
Finally, the Decision and Order cannot be based in law, when Poledna had 
"good cause" for quitting, as set out under the IDAPA. Further, with no understanding of 
what Poledna was doing in her employment, as more fully set out in the first issue, the 
Decision and Order cannot be based in law. 
The Decision and Order cou!d not be based in law when a critical piece of 
information was missing. 
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
We would respectfully ask the Court to reverse the Decision and Order entered in this 
matter and to award Unemployment Benefits to Poledna, subject her qualification. In 
the alternative, we would ask the Court to remand the matter for further processing. 
REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Counsel would ask for an award of any costs and attorney fees that may be 
awarded under Idaho Law, for the reasons set forth in this brief. 
I 
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Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Idaho Department of Labor 
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